Byzantine icons and things by Stephenson, Paul
bookview Book ReviewPaul Stephenson
 Oxford Art Journal Advance Access published June 16, 2016












Byzantine Icons and Things
Paul Stephenson
Paroma Chatterjee, The Living Icon in Byzantium and Italy: The Vita
Image, Eleventh to Thirteenth Centuries (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2014), 16 colour and 34 b&w illns, 297 pp., ISBN
9781107034969, hardcover £64.99
Glenn Peers, ed., Byzantine Things in the World (Houston, Texas: The
Menil Collection, 2013; distributed by Yale University Press), 100
colour illns, 192 pp., ISBN 9780300191783, hardcover $45
Bissera V. Pentcheva, The Sensual Icon: Space, Ritual and the Senses in
Byzantium (State College, PA: Penn State University Press, 2010), 72 colour
and 19 b&w illns, 320 pp., ISBN 9780271035833, paperback $44.95
‘The very fact that the Byzantines saw their art as realistic,
employed this concept as a criterion of excellence, and used
lifelikeness as a term of praise for achievements they admired
suggests the utility of separating their responses from our
own.’ This judgment of Anthony Cutler would surely seem
apposite to most today who look upon Byzantine art.1 The
fissure between modern and medieval viewer is widened by
the well-known fact that the Byzantines did not have a word for
art, or at least did not use a specific term in the manner that
we may choose (or not) to differentiate the work of a ‘maker’,
to use Cutler’s word, from an artist. Byzantinists cannot iden-
tify these makers and now most do not wish to do so, con-
sciously differentiating themselves from art historians of more
recent periods who may consider it essential to know the inti-
mate details of an artist’s life to understand what he or she
has made. An art history without artists requires a greater fo-
cus on what has been made and how it has been received and
understood, both by those for whom it was made and all those
who have looked upon it since. It is partly for this reason that
the rise of material culture studies has been welcomed by
Byzantinists, who appreciate its focus on the physical remains
of past cultures and the relationships between people and
their things. We now read frequently of the tactility of
Byzantine art, its engagement of all five physical senses and,
as importantly, of its numinous qualities, which engaged the
intellect, as one might engage with the divine only noetically.
The staple of Byzantine art history, the icon, was and is a me-
dium through which one might engage the divine. It was not
the only vehicle, of course, but it was among the most accessi-
ble and has occasioned the most comment. The icon is richly
sensual, made to be stroked and kissed, for light to shine
across or through, to cast shadows and be engulfed in scents
and smells, to be enlivened by those whose living breath
touches it.
This would appear to be a pedestrian point of departure for
Bissera Pentcheva, whose strikingly original insights into
Byzantine aesthetic theory have been published in several
important papers, both before and since the appearance of
her second monograph, The Sensual Icon.2 Pentcheva’s
preferred direction is away from ‘lifelikeness’ towards the
‘living icon’, an image that ‘was literally ‘in-spirited’ (em-
psychos, empnous, from pneo and pneuma, ‘to breathe and
breath’), receiving human breath and responding with a
spectacle of shimmer and glimmer’ (p. 122). Her works trace
the philosophical and sensual emergence of the living image,
the eikon, no longer understood as the flat painted panel of
the sixth to ninth centuries, nor only as the metal bas-relief
icon that dominated in eleventh-century Constantinople, but
rather as the ideas that shaped both. The triumph of low relief
was ephemeral, as a new iconoclasm of the first decade of
Komnenian rule (CE 1081-1204) destroyed icons by melting
them down, often using the metal to pay soldiers. From this de-
struction emerged a new, composite interpretation of eikon, a
painted panel with metal revetments.
Paroma Chatterjee takes Pentcheva’s definition of the
‘living icon’ as a stepping-off point in her important new reflec-
tion on the vita image, a type that juxtaposes a central icon
with framing narrative scenes, and generally painted rather
than metal revetment, thus engaging each viewer more fully in
the inherent dialogue between centre and frame. As
Chatterjee says, ‘the beholder of the saint’s image (and vi-
sions, relics, and dreams) was not expected to remain a pas-
sive recipient’) (p. 11). Chatterjee’s subject is not the maker,
whose role was to transmit not create, but the saint, a person
with the capacity to become a living image, an icon. As she
notes, saints appeared to Byzantines in order to validate icons,
not vice versa. The vita icon ‘aimed to remind viewers of the
tremendous ontological possibilities intrinsic to the very defini-
tion of a saint’ (p. 215). Chatterjee is also a sensitive and sub-
tle reader of texts. For example, she offers a sophisticated
analysis of a passage in the Life of St Nikon, which exposes
the tensions between text and image, vision, and representa-
tion. These tensions are shown to have survived in the
Byzantine understandings of the relationship between a holy
presence and its portrayal, even after the matter was suppos-
edly resolved by the formal ending of iconoclasm in CE 843.
Perhaps the greatest contribution Chatterjee makes to the dis-
cussion of Byzantine sanctity and art is in aiding a better ap-
preciation of complexity. There are no neat answers in her
book, which looks in detail at Italy as well as Byzantium, offer-
ing compelling insights into parallel developments of the vita
icon.
Curators today generally encourage viewers to think with
them about the things they have curated, but in a museum or
gallery it is possible to engage with the icon through only one
sense, sight. Even those who wish to highlight tactility in
exhibitions admit defeat.3 Kissing and stroking icons is
discouraged by those who believe devotional media should be
treated in exactly this way, and who embrace the idea that a
museum might recreate a devotional space, through
appropriate lighting and chanting, and even scenting. Mount
Sinai icons have appeared in several recent large exhibitions,
having travelled to museums placed in cases within cases,
and unpacked and installed in a manner that minimised their
contact with the profane, including the hands of curators and
the air of New York City and Los Angeles, and certainly the
fingers and lips of museum visitors. Monks travelled with the
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icons and remained with them throughout their stays in New
York City and Los Angeles, during the Met’s blockbuster
Byzantine exhibits in 1997 and 2004, and the Getty’s 2006–
2007 exhibition Holy Image, Hallowed Ground: Icons from
Sinai.4
The Byzantines understood that made things might enjoy a
peculiar relationship with the numinous or might be filled with
divine energy. Few of us find it strange that, when we touch a
metal object, e.g. a small copper jug that has been left outside
on a summer’s day, we find it hot. We understand that the
object itself has not generated the heat, but that it has been
heated by the sun, and therefore that it is the sun’s heat that
we feel emanating from it. If one believes that Christ is the true
sun, then one understands that matter can be penetrated
similarly by divine energy, and that things can transmit that
energy to us through our senses. Let us imagine we have gone
for a walk on a warm afternoon and forgotten to close our
satchel. Light waves released by the sun allow us to see a
small copper jug inside, within which our drinking water is now
unpleasantly warm, due to the sun’s heat rays and the fact
that copper conducts heat and energy especially well. The
Byzantines understood radiation as we do, but they
understood light rays rather differently. Looking at a metal jug,
according to the theory of intromission (Democritus, Epicurus),
we absorb the atoms or energy that it emits (Plato identified
the energy emitted as light rays). If one rejects this premise,
preferring the theory of extramission (Euclid, Ptolemy), then
the eye emitted energy (pneuma, Galen’s term before it was
Pentcheva’s), which bouncing off the thing returned to the eye.
In either case it is energy which passed through the eye to
imprint the jug’s form in the viewer’s mind. In both theories,
the eye engages with the thing seen, the jug, and perceives it
by sharing its energy, or rather by receiving part of its matter
that has been energised by the divine.5
Many things absorb the sun’s energy, but some store and
conduct it better than others. So it is with divine energy, which
some things by their nature, by contact or proximity or by how
they are fashioned, are able to store and conduct better than
others. Pilgrim tokens are especially effective at storing and
radiating grace, for they may be fashioned from the soil on
which a holy athlete once engaged in spiritual combat with the
Devil and his demons. Ampullae, pilgrim flasks, improved
upon tokens by containing and preserving holy fluid, e.g. sweat
or ooze from a tomb, or water blessed by contact with the
saint’s tomb, or oil from a jug near a tomb. Water and oil were
brought by pilgrims who visited the tomb of St Menas at Abu
Mena in Egypt, whence came examples of pilgrim tokens and
flasks that can today is to be found in the Walters Art Museum
in Baltimore, Maryland, alongside a small copper jug (Fig. 1).
Like the ampullae, this jug could contain and preserve a liquid.
Today it does not have lid, but a similar jug in the Metropolitan
Museum of Art shows that the liquid contained within it would
have been prevented from spilling by the insertion of a
stopper, attached by a chain to the jug’s handle. Of equal
practical value is the band around the neck of the jug, which
features three tokens of mounted figures, ‘holy riders’, who
would have protected the water not from spilling but from
becoming polluted. The jug was permeated by divine energy,
by grace, but in placing specific images on its neck we have
sought to direct that energy to one purpose.
Pilgrims frequently brought ampullae or jugs as blessings,
eulogia, from their destination to protect them as they
travelled home. Not all travelers in the late antique and
medieval eastern Mediterranean were pilgrims sensu stricto.
But pilgrims can be expected to have a feeling for divine
energy, so let us imagine the owner of the jug was indeed a
pilgrim in and through his world of things absorbing, storing,
and radiating grace. Let us explore a proposition: in this world,
a Byzantine world, our pilgrim, the subject of this sentence, did
not look at and touch his jug, the object of this sentence, in his
open satchel and wonder whether his water was too hot to
drink. To quote Glenn Peers, ‘rather than continue to support
this anachronistic imposition of Cartesian civil order [we
should argue] for the empathic and heuristic adoption of the
relational, animist worldview of Byzantines’.6 When we write
‘the pilgrim (subject) looks at his jug (object)’, Peers might
observe that we misunderstand the relation between
‘dividuals’ and deny the jug full subjecthood with full rights of
relation and participation.
This formulation may appear designed to repel those who
are not engaged in sophisticated scholarship from
contemplating the jug and the person who once drank from it.
But this is not Peers’ intention; quite the opposite is the case.
Peer’s exploration in dividuation was preparatory work for an
exhibition intended to engage a far wider audience, and to
present to them Byzantine material culture, Byzantine Things
in the World, in a manner that hints at connections the
Byzantines may themselves have made. Byzantine things were
juxtaposed with, placed in dialogue with modern things, ‘like-
minded things’, so that they may, albeit incompletely, reveal
their agency. In Peers’ view, ‘“Art” is a death certificate for
Byzantine material culture, because it suppresses all the
living, active aspects of these historical things’.7 Therefore, if
the ‘paradoxical process of giving back thingness is difficult,
impossible fully . . . perhaps eliminating some of the art from
Fig. 1. Copper ‘pilgrim jug’, sixth or seventh century CE, Walters Art Museum,
Baltimore, MD, 53.155, museum purchase, 1991. Photograph: Paul Stephenson.
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the thing is a useful strategy, at least as a starting point’.8 If,
as Peers acknowledges, it is impossible fully to recover a
Byzantine world of things, his exhibition and its catalogue
prove that it is possible to look with fresh eyes at the remains
of Byzantium, to engage with Byzantine things in our world
alongside other things from other worlds, all drawn from the
Menil Collection in Houston, Texas. These include a boli power
object from Mali held to exude a ‘thick flow of energy known as
nyama. . . an animating force, charging people, the landscape,
and objects with life’.9 This approach to the presentation of
the remains of Byzantium is immediately appealing.10 In
placing emphasis on interaction with and by things it engages
more fully the humanity of Byzantines, and invites the viewer
to contemplate the similarities and differences between
Byzantium and other human societies. This may be contrasted
with methods for engaging audiences at recent blockbuster
exhibitions of Byzantine art, including ethnic marketing that
invited engagement of Greeks, Bulgarians, Russians, others,
with ‘their’ pasts.11
Peers’ reflections on animate, active, engaging things are
substantial because they, like Pentcheva’s and Chatterjee’s,
have both a solid empirical foundation and an established
theoretical context. The empirical foundation is provided by the
many Byzantine texts that recount tales of wondrous things
‘thinging the world’. Admittedly, most of these texts concern
icons, things that were fashioned as divine images, or which
had divine images painted or impressed upon them. Peers’
reflections on icons and things, and on icons as things, also
have a solid theoretical basis, allowing us to return to jugs,
upon which Martin Heidegger reflected in his essay ‘The Thing
(Das Ding, 1950)’.12 Heidegger observed that things exist
independently of our comprehension of them, even if we have
manufactured them, and therefore we cannot fully
comprehend them. The jug is not an object, although we
objectify that part of it that we comprehend when we look at it.
Free of our comprehension, by its unmediated presence,
nature, and actions, the jug-thing ‘things’. Heidegger’s ontolog-
ical reflections on thingliness have been useful in a number of
fields, e.g. ecology, where theorists have developed a biocen-
tric critique of anthropocentrism attitudes towards nature and
the relationship between man and the natural environment.
Certainly, as Heidegger observed in his earlier reflections on
things, ‘the stone in the road is a thing, as is the clod of earth
in the field. A jug is a thing, as is the well beside the road’.13
One might observe that there are differences between things
that exist in the natural world – a stone, a clod of earth – and
made things, such as a road and a jug. It was with made things
that Heidegger was mostly concerned in this earlier essay, on
‘The origin of the work of art’ (1935–1937).
The discussion of ‘things’ has a long history, pre-dating even
Heidegger’s initial interest in 1935, and it has informed litera-
ture ever since, e.g. Vladimir Nabokov’s Transparent Things,
where on the first page we read: ‘When we concentrate on a
material object, whatever its situation, the very act of attention
may lead to our involuntarily sinking into the history of that ob-
ject. Novices must learn to skim over matter if they want matter
to stay at the exact level of the moment. Transparent things,
through which the past shines!’14 Learning to skim rather than
sink has been popular in art historical scholarship for decades,
although Bill Brown, a leading voice in ‘thing theory’, reminds
us that to consider the very recent engagement with things by
Byzantine art historians as belated is only to acknowledge that
‘the academic psyche has internalised the fashion system (a
system meant to accelerate the obsolescence of things)’.15
doi:10.1093/oxartj/kcw003
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